HackerFeeds
All ransomware groups

lockbit

5 tracked victims
·first seen 2020-10-21·last activity 2021-08-23

Group profile

LockBit is one of the most prolific ransomware groups in history, operating as a full RaaS platform that at its peak accounted for an estimated 44% of all ransomware incidents globally in 2023, targeting virtually every sector worldwide through an affiliate model where developers maintain infrastructure and affiliates conduct intrusions.

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

TA0001

Initial Access

  • T1078Valid Accounts

    Use of compromised credentials purchased from initial access brokers or obtained through phishing to authenticate to victim environments via RDP or VPN.

  • T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

    LockBit actors exploit vulnerabilities in public-facing applications including Citrix Bleed (CVE-2023-4966), Fortinet, and other perimeter devices to gain initial access.

  • T1566Phishing

    Spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments or links used to deliver initial stagers.

TA0002

Execution

  • T1047Windows Management Instrumentation

    WMI used for remote execution of payloads across compromised hosts.

  • T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

    Scheduled tasks created for persistent execution of the LockBit payload and post-compromise tooling.

  • T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

    PowerShell scripts used to deploy ransomware payloads and execute post-exploitation modules.

TA0003

Persistence

  • T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys

    Registry Run keys modified to ensure ransomware payload executes on system reboot.

TA0005

Defense Evasion

  • T1027Obfuscated Files or Information

    LockBit payloads are packed and obfuscated; LockBit 3.0 (Black) uses code from BlackMatter ransomware with added anti-analysis techniques.

  • T1070.001Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs

    Event logs cleared to remove forensic evidence of the intrusion prior to or after ransomware deployment.

  • T1562.001Disable or Modify Tools

    Windows Defender and other AV/EDR tools disabled via PowerShell commands and Group Policy modifications prior to ransomware deployment.

TA0006

Credential Access

  • T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

    Mimikatz and custom tools used to dump LSASS memory for credential harvesting to facilitate lateral movement.

  • T1110Brute Force

    Brute force attacks against RDP and other remote services to obtain valid credentials.

TA0007

Discovery

  • T1046Network Service Discovery

    Network scanning tools (Advanced IP Scanner, nmap) used to enumerate hosts, open ports, and services within the victim environment.

  • T1482Domain Trust Discovery

    Active Directory enumeration to map domain trusts and identify targets for lateral movement and domain compromise.

TA0008

Lateral Movement

  • T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

    RDP used extensively for lateral movement across the victim network using stolen credentials.

  • T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

    PsExec and SMB admin shares leveraged to propagate the ransomware payload laterally.

  • T1210Exploitation of Remote Services

    Exploitation of unpatched internal services to move laterally within the network.

TA0009

Collection

  • T1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility

    7-Zip and WinRAR used to compress stolen data prior to exfiltration as part of double extortion operations.

TA0010

Exfiltration

  • T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

    SFTP and FTP used to transmit stolen data to actor-controlled infrastructure.

  • T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

    Rclone and MEGASync used to exfiltrate victim data to cloud storage services ahead of encryption as part of the double extortion model.

TA0011

Command and Control

  • T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy

    Tor and other anonymization networks used to obfuscate C2 infrastructure.

  • T1219Remote Access Software

    AnyDesk and other legitimate remote access tools deployed as backdoors for persistent C2 access.

TA0040

Impact

  • T1486Data Encrypted for Impact

    LockBit uses AES-256 for file encryption with RSA-2048 for key protection. LockBit 3.0 uses Salsa20; files are appended with a victim-specific extension. Operates as RaaS with affiliate program.

  • T1489Service Stop

    Database, backup, and security services terminated before encryption to maximize file access and encryption coverage.

  • T1490Inhibit System Recovery

    Shadow copies and backups deleted using vssadmin and wmic commands to prevent recovery without paying the ransom.

Recent victims

DateWebsite / victimSectorCountry
2021-08-23
B
Bangkok Airways
Transportation/LogisticsTH
2021-07-30
A
Accenture
Technology
2021-04-01
M
Merseyrail (Rail network)
Transportation/LogisticsGB
2020-11-30
K
Kopter
ManufacturingCH
2020-10-21
P
Press Trust of India (PTI)
TechnologyIN