CVE-2026-61891In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 1.73.1, the `@theia/filesystem` backend exposes HTTP file-download endpoints (`GET /file`, `GET /files/`, `PUT /files/`) that convert a client-supplied URI directly to a filesystem path and stream the file, without confining it to the workspace or any allow-listed root. In browser (non-Electron) deployments the connection token is enforced only on WebSocket upgrades; the HTTP middleware in `@theia/core` re-issues the cookie and calls `next()` without rejecting tokenless HTTP requests, so these endpoints are reachable without a valid token. As a result an unauthenticated client can read any file readable by the backend process, including files outside the opened workspace (for example `/etc/hosts`, SSH keys, or tokens). Electron mode uses a separate `ElectronSecurityToken` and is not affected via this path.
2026-08-05 · score 7.5
CVE-2026-18933The wp-downloadmanager WordPress plugin, in version 1.68.11 (also affecting the 6.9.4 release line), allows an admin-privileged user (current_user_can('manage_downloads')) to upload arbitrary files via download-add.php with no extension or MIME-type validation of any kind - no wp_check_filetype_and_ext(), no validate_file(), and no extension blocklist exist anywhere in the upload handler. The destination path is additionally built by concatenating the raw, unsanitized $_POST['file_upload_to'] value with no traversal check (no ../ filtering, no basename()/realpath() applied). Since the base download path is required to live under WP_CONTENT_DIR (a web-accessible location), an uploaded PHP file lands in a web-servable path and can be directly executed, resulting in remote code execution. The plugin's own later changelog confirms these protections were absent in this version: v1.69 added file-type validation via wp_check_filetype_and_ext(), and v1.69.1 added directory-traversal protection - neither existed in 1.68.11.
2026-08-05 · score 7.2
CVE-2026-71252toner-management's admin state-changing handlers (add.php, edit.php, delete.php under admin/toners, admin/toner-brands, admin/printers, and related admin subdirectories) executed INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE database operations with no authentication or authorization check, while access control was enforced only in listing views. An unauthenticated remote attacker could invoke these handlers directly to create, modify, or destroy application data. The vendor has since merged a fix requiring an authenticated admin session before any such handler proceeds.
2026-08-05 · score 8.2
CVE-2026-71245Mautic's getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction (LeadBundle/Controller/AjaxController.php) reads a field parameter from the request, sanitizes it only with InputHelper::clean() (which HTML-entity-encodes quotes and angle brackets but does not restrict other characters), and passes it into LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue() where it is concatenated directly as a raw SQL column identifier ($col = 'l.'.$field) rather than being validated against a whitelist of real column names or passed as a bound parameter. Since Doctrine cannot parameterize identifiers, and the sanitizer does not block spaces, parentheses, or other SQL-relevant characters, an attacker can inject SQL via the field name itself. The action requires only a valid session (any authenticated user), unlike sibling actions in the same controller that carry additional permission checks.
2026-08-05 · score 7.1
CVE-2026-71243The backmeup npm package assembles shell command strings by directly concatenating its option values (name, source, destination, filter) - e.g. cmd = "mkdir -p " + path.join(info.destination, info.name) + "; " - and executes the resulting string through a shell via ssh2-exec (locally via child_process, or remotely via SSH when an ssh handle is supplied), rather than using execFile/spawn with an argument array. The only processing applied is path.normalize()/path.join(), which do not neutralize shell metacharacters (;, |, &, $(), backticks, newline). Any application that passes attacker-influenced values into these options (e.g. a user-chosen backup name) is vulnerable to arbitrary OS command execution on the backup host, or on the remote SSH target when one is configured.
2026-08-05 · score 8.8
