CVE-2026-71254

CRITICAL9.8

Published 2026-08-05 · Source 309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c

Description

nanoMODBUS through v1.23.0 contains an out-of-bounds write in the Modbus server-side handle_read_file_record() function (FC 0x14, Read File Record) in nanomodbus.c. The function validates that the total request size does not exceed 245 bytes and that each sub-request's record_length is at most 124, but it never validates the CUMULATIVE response size across all sub-requests before processing them. The accumulator response_data_size is declared as uint8_t and is incremented by 2 + record_length*2 for each of up to 35 sub-requests; with 35 sub-requests of record_length=124, the cumulative demand is 8750 bytes, which overflows the uint8_t accumulator. A subsequent loop then calls get_n(), an internal function with no bounds checking, once per sub-request to obtain a pointer into the 260-byte msg.buf receive buffer and advances the internal buf_idx by up to 248 bytes per call; swap_regs() then writes to that pointer unconditionally. A single crafted FC 0x14 request from an unauthenticated network client can cause up to ~8490 bytes to be written out of bounds past the 260-byte buffer, corrupting adjacent memory in the server process and leading to denial of service or potential remote code execution, particularly on embedded/bare-metal targets without memory protection.

CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE-787

References

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