CVE-2026-50240A flaw was found in OpenShift Pipelines-as-Code (PAC). PAC does not verify whether the creator of a Repository custom resource has permission to create PipelineRuns. A namespace user with only Repository and Secret create/delete permissions can cause PAC to execute attacker-controlled PipelineRuns as the auto-provisioned pipeline ServiceAccount, which carries ClusterRole/edit by default. This results in namespace-scoped privilege escalation, enabling Secret read, resource creation/modification/deletion, and potential supply chain injection in CI/CD namespaces.
2026-11-06 · score 8.8
CVE-2026-123791A vulnerability was detected in OpenBMB Internet of Agents up to 9d78e88e47160eb42ee1ee8538c05e1c2c47877a. This affects the function _primary_field_query of the file common/utils/milvus_utils.py of the component Agent Registry. The manipulation of the argument key results in improper neutralization of special elements in data query logic. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. This product operates on a rolling release basis, ensuring continuous delivery. Consequently, there are no version details for either affected or updated releases. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
2026-11-06 · score 7.3
CVE-2026-85736Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, connection creation or update stored attacker-chosen absolute SSL and SSH file paths, and later connection cleanup passed those stored paths to fs.unlink without a path restriction. The vulnerable surface is data-connection certificate and SSH-key cleanup when a connection is removed. A user with createOwn and deleteOwn permissions on their own team stores a target path in a connection and then deletes the connection to trigger cleanup; default self-signup grants teamOwner these permissions. The cleanup routine treats the stored SSL or SSH path as a managed certificate path and unlinks the referenced file; duplicateConnection provides a second advisory-identified trigger. The attacker must be able to create or update and then delete a connection on their own team. The default container runs Chartbrew as uid 0, while deployments with a less-privileged process are limited by that process's deletion permissions. The attacker can delete files such as /code/.env or application source, causing integrity loss and service disruption. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3.
2026-11-06 · score 8.1
CVE-2026-85726Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, a date-typed MongoDB variable placed inside a quoted query placeholder was inserted as an unescaped string, unlike the safely escaped or coerced string, number, and Boolean branches. The vulnerable surface is mongoDB-backed public, shareable, or embedded charts processed by date-variable substitution. An unauthenticated user supplies a crafted URL filter to a public, shareable, or embedded MongoDB chart whose query places a date-typed variable in a quoted literal. The crafted date value breaks out of the quoted literal and changes query logic; the chart's returned row count becomes a Boolean oracle for character-by-character field extraction. The chart must be externally reachable and use the vulnerable date-in-quoted-placeholder branch. Extraction is read-only and limited to one queried collection per request, and it requires neither an account nor a known field value. The blind oracle can disclose any field in the queried collection, including secrets the chart does not display. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3.
2026-11-06 · score 7.5
CVE-2026-85712Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, the shared project permission check trusted a caller-controlled team_id and let the teamOwner/teamAdmin branch continue without confirming that the target project belonged to that team. The vulnerable surface is project routes and related authorization checks that accepted user-controlled project identifiers. An authenticated user who is an owner or admin of their own team submits a victim project id together with the attacker's own team_id in the request body; default self-signup grants the required role on the user's own team. Authorization is evaluated against the attacker-selected team instead of the target project's team, and the update path mass-assigns the request body without a project field allow-list. The attacker needs a valid Chartbrew account, an owner or admin role on their own team, and a victim project identifier; requests without the body team_id trick are rejected. The attacker can re-parent the victim project into their own team, gain full read and write access, expose it publicly, remove password protection, and cause the victim to lose it; the shared delete route also permits cross-tenant deletion. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3.
2026-11-06 · score 8.8
