CVE-2026-6329

UNKNOWN

Published 2026-06-25 · Source facts@wolfssl.com

Description

PKCS#12 MAC verification uses an attacker-controlled comparison length, weakening the integrity check on the MAC and allowing a mismatched MAC to be accepted. The PKCS#12 verify path compared the locally computed HMAC against the MAC parsed from the PKCS#12 structure using a length taken directly from the attacker-supplied input, without first verifying that it equals the length of the digest actually produced by the configured algorithm. A truncated or zero-length stored MAC could therefore be accepted, defeating the integrity protection of the MAC.

CWE-347

References

View on NVD

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