CVE-2026-52930

UNKNOWN

Published 2026-06-24 · Source 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipc/shm: serialize orphan cleanup with shm_nattch updates shm_destroy_orphaned() walks the shm idr under shm_ids(ns).rwsem, but that does not serialize all fields tested by shm_may_destroy(). In particular, shm_nattch is updated while holding shm_perm.lock, and attach paths can do that without holding the rwsem. Do not decide that an orphaned segment is unused before taking the object lock. Move the shm_may_destroy() check under shm_perm.lock, matching the other destroy paths, and unlock the segment when it no longer qualifies for removal.

References

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Related CVEs

Same severity, most recent

CVE-2026-52942
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_log: validate MAC header was set before dumping it The fallback path of dump_mac_header() guards the MAC header access only with "skb->mac_header != skb->network_header", without checking skb_mac_header_was_set(). When the MAC header is unset, mac_header is 0xffff, so the test passes and skb_mac_header(skb) returns skb->head + 0xffff, ~64 KiB past the buffer; the loop then reads dev->hard_header_len bytes out of bounds into the kernel log. This is reachable via the netdev logger: nf_log_unknown_packet() calls dump_mac_header() unconditionally, and an skb sent through AF_PACKET with PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS reaches the egress hook with mac_header still unset (__dev_queue_xmit(), which would reset it, is bypassed). Add the skb_mac_header_was_set() check the ARPHRD_ETHER path already uses, and replace the open-coded MAC header length test with skb_mac_header_len(). Only skbs with an unset MAC header are affected; valid ones are dumped as before. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800ea49d3f by task exploit/148 Call Trace: kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) dump_mac_header (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:831) nf_log_netdev_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:938 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c:963) nf_log_packet (net/netfilter/nf_log.c:260) nft_log_eval (net/netfilter/nft_log.c:60) nft_do_chain (net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:285) nft_do_chain_netdev (net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:307) nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619) nf_hook_direct_egress (net/packet/af_packet.c:257) packet_xmit (net/packet/af_packet.c:280) packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2265)
2026-06-24 · score —
CVE-2026-52941
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: avoid NULL deref of conn->lnk in smc_msg_event tracepoint The smc_msg_event tracepoint class, shared by smc_tx_sendmsg and smc_rx_recvmsg, unconditionally dereferences smc->conn.lnk: __string(name, smc->conn.lnk->ibname) conn->lnk is only set for SMC-R; for SMC-D it is NULL. Other code on these paths already handles this (e.g. !conn->lnk in SMC_STAT_RMB_TX_SIZE_SMALL()). With the tracepoint enabled, the first sendmsg()/recvmsg() on an SMC-D socket crashes: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [...] RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 Call Trace: trace_event_raw_event_smc_msg_event (net/smc/smc_tracepoint.h:44) smc_rx_recvmsg (net/smc/smc_rx.c:515) smc_recvmsg (net/smc/af_smc.c:2859) __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315) __x64_sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2326) do_syscall_64 The faulting address 0x3e0 is offsetof(struct smc_link, ibname), confirming the NULL ->lnk deref. Enabling the tracepoint requires root, but the trigger itself is unprivileged: socket(AF_SMC, ...) has no capability check, and SMC-D negotiation needs no admin step on s390 or on x86 with the loopback ISM device loaded. Log an empty device name for SMC-D instead of dereferencing NULL.
2026-06-24 · score —
CVE-2026-52940
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tun: zero the whole vnet header in tun_put_user() tun_put_user() declares an on-stack struct virtio_net_hdr_v1_hash_tunnel without zeroing it. For a non-tunnel skb, virtio_net_hdr_tnl_from_skb() only initializes the first 10 bytes (sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr)), leaving bytes 10..23 (num_buffers and the hash/tunnel fields) as stack garbage. An unprivileged user can set the vnet header size to 24 with TUNSETVNETHDRSZ, so __tun_vnet_hdr_put() copies all 24 bytes of the partially-initialized struct to userspace, leaking 14 bytes of kernel stack on every read of a non-tunnel packet. Fix it the same way tun_get_user() already does by zeroing the whole header right after declaration.
2026-06-24 · score —
CVE-2026-52939
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: fix NULL deref in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() on masked atomic completion rds_ib_xmit_atomic() always programs a masked atomic opcode (IB_WR_MASKED_ATOMIC_CMP_AND_SWP or IB_WR_MASKED_ATOMIC_FETCH_AND_ADD) for every RDS atomic cmsg. But the completion-side switch in rds_ib_send_unmap_op() only handles the non-masked opcodes, so a masked atomic completion falls through to default and returns rm == NULL while send->s_op is left set. rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() then dereferences the NULL rm via rm->m_final_op, oopsing in softirq context. An unprivileged AF_RDS sendmsg() of an atomic cmsg over an active RDS/IB connection triggers it; on hardware that natively accepts masked atomics (mlx4, mlx5) no extra setup is needed. RDS/IB: rds_ib_send_unmap_op: unexpected opcode 0xd in WR! Oops: general protection fault [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000190-0x0000000000000197] RIP: rds_ib_send_cqe_handler+0x25c/0xb10 (net/rds/ib_send.c:282) Call Trace: <IRQ> rds_ib_send_cqe_handler (net/rds/ib_send.c:282) poll_scq (net/rds/ib_cm.c:274) rds_ib_tasklet_fn_send (net/rds/ib_cm.c:294) tasklet_action_common (kernel/softirq.c:943) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:573) run_ksoftirqd (kernel/softirq.c:479) </IRQ> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Handle the masked atomic opcodes in the same case as the non-masked ones: they map to the same struct rds_message.atomic union member, so the existing container_of()/rds_ib_send_unmap_atomic() body is correct for them.
2026-06-24 · score —
CVE-2026-52938
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in bpf_sk_storage_clone and diag paths bpf_selem_unlink_nofail() sets SDATA(selem)->smap to NULL before removing the selem from the storage hlist. A concurrent RCU reader in bpf_sk_storage_clone() can observe the selem still on the list with smap already NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000050-0x0000000000000057] RIP: 0010:bpf_sk_storage_clone+0x1cd/0xaa0 net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c:174 Call Trace: <IRQ> sk_clone+0xfed/0x1980 net/core/sock.c:2591 inet_csk_clone_lock+0x30/0x760 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1222 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x35/0x2680 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:571 tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x123/0xf90 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1729 tcp_check_req+0x8e1/0x2580 include/net/tcp.h:855 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1845/0x3b80 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2347 Add a NULL check for smap in bpf_sk_storage_clone(). bpf_sk_storage_diag_put_all() has the same issue. Add a NULL check and pass the validated smap directly to diag_get(), which is refactored to take smap as a parameter instead of reading it internally. bpf_sk_storage_diag_put() uses diag->maps[i] which is always valid under its refcount, so diag->maps[i] is passed directly to diag_get().
2026-06-24 · score —